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Engineering/incident-response-plan

Incident Response Plan

You need a security incident response plan with severity levels, playbooks, roles, and notification timelines.

Use this when an organization needs a security incident response plan before an incident happens, or when a security incident has occurred and the response needs structure. Covers the full lifecycle: detection, containment, eradication, recovery, and lessons learned.

Related skills: Use /crisis-comms-playbook for communication framework during security scenarios. Use /incident-postmortem for blameless post-incident review. Use /stakeholder-comms for breach notification drafting. Use /compliance-map for regulatory notification requirements.

Process

Step 1: Gather organization context

Collect the following from the user:

  • Team structure -- who is on-call, who has production access, who has authority to take systems offline
  • Systems in scope -- production services, data stores, infrastructure, third-party integrations
  • Existing monitoring and alerting -- SIEM, log aggregation, intrusion detection, uptime monitoring
  • Regulatory requirements -- GDPR (72-hour notification), state breach notification laws, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, industry-specific mandates
  • Communication channels -- incident Slack channel, phone tree, video bridge, out-of-band communication (if primary channels are compromised)
  • Legal counsel contacts -- internal counsel, external breach counsel, cyber insurance carrier
  • Existing incident history -- past incidents, what worked, what didn't

Step 2: Define incident severity levels

Build a classification matrix specific to security events:

| Severity | Criteria | Examples | Response Time | Escalation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical (S1) | Active data breach, ransomware, complete system compromise | Customer PII exfiltrated, ransomware encrypting production, root access compromised | Immediate -- all hands | CEO, Legal, Board (if applicable) |
| High (S2) | Unauthorized access detected, credential compromise, active exploitation | Admin credentials leaked, lateral movement detected, zero-day exploitation | < 1 hour | VP Engineering, CISO, Legal |
| Medium (S3) | Suspicious activity, policy violation, contained compromise | Anomalous access patterns, unauthorized configuration change, phishing success (contained) | < 4 hours | Security team lead, Engineering manager |
| Low (S4) | Failed attack attempt, minor policy deviation | Blocked brute force, policy exception request, low-severity vulnerability discovered | Next business day | Security team |

Step 3: Build response playbooks per incident type

For each incident type, produce a step-by-step playbook. Each playbook follows this structure:

Incident types to cover: data breach, unauthorized access, malware/ransomware, DDoS, insider threat, supply chain compromise.

Playbook template per type:

## {{incident_type}} Playbook

### Detection triggers
- {{specific_alert_or_signal_1}}
- {{specific_alert_or_signal_2}}

### Immediate containment (first 30 minutes)
1. {{containment_step_1}}
2. {{containment_step_2}}
3. {{containment_step_3}}

### Evidence preservation
- [ ] {{evidence_item_1}}
- [ ] {{evidence_item_2}}

### Communication protocol
- Notify: {{role}} via {{channel}} within {{timeframe}}
- Do NOT: {{action_to_avoid}}

### Escalation path
- If {{condition}}, escalate to {{role}}

### Eradication steps
1. {{eradication_step}}

### Recovery steps
1. {{recovery_step}}

### Regulatory notification required?
- {{framework}}: {{requirement_and_deadline}}

Playbooks must be usable under stress. Clear numbered steps, not dense paragraphs. Someone reading this at 2 AM during an active breach should be able to follow it.

Step 4: Map roles and responsibilities

Define the incident response team with clear ownership:

RoleResponsibilityBackupActivation Method
Incident CommanderOwns the response, makes containment decisions, controls communication cadence{{backup_name}}{{pager/phone/slack}}
Technical LeadLeads investigation, directs containment and eradication{{backup_name}}{{method}}
Communications LeadManages internal and external messaging, coordinates with PR{{backup_name}}{{method}}
Legal CounselAdvises on notification obligations, evidence preservation, liability{{backup_name}}{{method}}
Executive SponsorAuthorizes business-impacting decisions (taking revenue systems offline){{backup_name}}{{method}}

Define who activates the plan and how: war room channel creation, bridge line, physical assembly point.

Step 5: Generate notification timeline templates

Build notification sequences aligned with regulatory deadlines:

Internal notifications:

  • T+0: Incident Commander notified, activates response team
  • T+15min: Technical Lead confirms severity classification
  • T+1hr: Executive Sponsor briefed (S1/S2 only)
  • T+4hr: Legal Counsel briefed with preliminary scope

External notifications (if required):

  • T+24hr: Regulatory body preliminary notification (where required)
  • T+48hr: Customer notification draft reviewed by Legal
  • T+72hr: GDPR supervisory authority notification deadline
  • T+varies: State breach notification deadlines (range from 30-90 days)

Public communication (if required):

  • Only after Legal and Communications Lead approve
  • Template: acknowledge the incident, state what's known, describe actions taken, provide contact for affected parties

Step 6: Evidence preservation procedures

Before any remediation that might destroy evidence, capture:

  • System logs (application, authentication, network, firewall) -- export and hash
  • Memory dumps from affected systems
  • Network packet captures from the incident timeframe
  • Access records (who accessed what, when, from where)
  • Malware samples (if applicable) -- isolate, do not delete
  • Screenshots of attacker activity (if visible)
  • Chain of custody documentation -- who collected what, when, how it was stored

Store evidence in a separate, access-controlled location. Document the chain of custody. If law enforcement involvement is possible, do not modify evidence.

Step 7: Post-incident process

After the incident is resolved:

  1. Immediate (within 48 hours): Hand off to /incident-postmortem for blameless review
  2. Within 1 week: Complete regulatory reporting if required
  3. Within 2 weeks: Customer follow-up with remediation details
  4. Within 30 days: Insurance notification and claims process (if cyber insurance exists)
  5. Ongoing: Track remediation items from postmortem to completion

Step 8: Review

Ask the user:

  • Does the team have prior incident response experience?
  • Are there legal requirements we haven't addressed?
  • Who is the designated Incident Commander, and do they know?
  • Does cyber insurance exist, and what are its notification requirements?
  • Is there an out-of-band communication plan if primary channels (email, Slack) are compromised?
  • Has the plan been tested with a tabletop exercise?

Output location

Deliver as a markdown document. Suggested filename: incident-response-plan-{{org-name}}-{{date}}.md. This document should live somewhere the on-call team can access during an incident -- not buried in a wiki nobody checks.

Example Output

Input

  • Organization: Meridian Health Analytics — 280-person Series C healthtech company processing PHI for 140 hospital clients across 23 states
  • Systems in scope: AWS production environment (ECS/RDS/S3), Snowflake data warehouse containing de-identified patient datasets, Salesforce CRM, Auth0 for customer SSO, PagerDuty + Datadog for monitoring, no SIEM currently deployed
  • Regulatory requirements: HIPAA (BAAs in place with all 140 clients), GDPR (3 EU-based hospital clients), California CMIA, Texas Health & Safety Code breach notification
  • Team structure: 4-person security team (1 CISO, 2 security engineers, 1 GRC analyst), 12-person platform engineering on-call rotation, VP Engineering, General Counsel (internal), external breach counsel on retainer at Covington & Burling, cyber insurance through Chubb (policy #CHB-449821)
  • Incident history: One prior S3 misconfiguration in 2022 (no PHI exposed), response was disorganized — no designated IC, engineers modified systems before evidence was preserved

Incident Response Plan — Meridian Health Analytics

Version 1.0 | Prepared: 2025-01-15 Filename: incident-response-plan-meridian-health-analytics-2025-01-15.md Access: Pin in #security-incidents Slack channel + PagerDuty runbook library

⚠️ If you are reading this during an active incident: Go directly to the relevant playbook in Section 3. Do not read this document linearly. Preserve evidence before remediating anything.


Section 1: Severity Classification Matrix

SeverityCriteriaMeridian-Specific ExamplesResponse TimeInitial Escalation
Critical (S1)Active PHI exfiltration, ransomware, complete production compromiseSnowflake data warehouse accessed by unauthorized party, ransomware in ECS cluster, RDS backup exfiltrated to external storageImmediate — all handsCISO, VP Engineering, General Counsel, CEO within 15 min
High (S2)Unauthorized access confirmed, credential compromise, active lateral movementAuth0 admin credentials in breach dump, engineer IAM keys exposed on GitHub, anomalous cross-account AWS API calls< 1 hourCISO, VP Engineering, General Counsel
Medium (S3)Suspicious activity, contained policy violation, phishing success with no lateral movementEmployee clicked phishing link (machine isolated), unauthorized config change in non-PHI environment, failed privilege escalation attempt< 4 hoursCISO, Security team lead
Low (S4)Failed attacks, minor deviations, low-severity findingsBlocked SSH brute force, port scan from known scanner, low-severity CVE in non-internet-facing serviceNext business daySecurity team

PHI involvement automatically escalates any incident one severity level.


Section 2: Incident Response Team

RolePrimaryBackupActivation
Incident CommanderCISO (Renata Osei)VP Engineering (David Chun)PagerDuty P1 alert + direct cell
Technical LeadSenior Security Engineer (on-call rotation)Platform Engineering on-callPagerDuty escalation policy SEC-ONCALL
Communications LeadVP Marketing (Sara Fielding)General CounselSlack DM + cell (S1/S2 only)
Legal Counsel — InternalGeneral Counsel (Marcus Webb)Outside: Covington & Burling breach lineDirect cell for S1/S2; email for S3
Legal Counsel — ExternalCovington & Burling (breach hotline: 202-662-XXXX)IC authorizes contact; S1 PHI breaches always engaged
Executive SponsorCEO (Priya Nambiar)COOIC calls directly; do not Slack for S1
Insurance LiaisonGRC Analyst (Tom Rickard)General CounselNotified within 24hr of S1/S2; Chubb hotline on file

War room activation: IC creates #inc-YYYYMMDD-[short-description] in Slack and pastes this plan link. Bridge line: Zoom Personal Room (CISO). If Slack is compromised, use Signal group "MHA Incident Bridge" (pre-established).


Section 3: Response Playbooks


🔴 Playbook A: PHI Data Breach / Unauthorized Data Access

Detection triggers

  • Datadog alert: Snowflake query volume > 3× baseline from single user/IP
  • AWS GuardDuty: S3 GetObject spike on PHI buckets from non-application principals
  • External report: client, researcher, or threat intelligence source reports Meridian data in the wild
  • Auth0 log: bulk export or API calls inconsistent with normal application behavior

Immediate containment (first 30 minutes)

  1. Do not modify affected systems yet. Assign a dedicated engineer to evidence preservation (Step A-EP) before any remediation.
  2. Identify the access vector: compromised credential, misconfigured resource, or application vulnerability.
  3. Revoke the specific credential, API key, or session token involved — not all credentials system-wide (avoid service disruption without IC authorization).
  4. If Snowflake: suspend the offending user/role via ALTER USER <name> SET DISABLED = TRUE. Do not drop the user.
  5. If S3: apply a bucket policy deny for the offending principal; do not delete bucket logs.
  6. IC confirms severity classification with Technical Lead. If PHI confirmed or suspected → S1.
  7. IC notifies General Counsel immediately (PHI breach triggers HIPAA clock).

Evidence preservation — A-EP

  • Export Snowflake query history for the past 30 days: INFORMATION_SCHEMA.QUERY_HISTORY — save as CSV, SHA-256 hash the file
  • Export AWS CloudTrail logs for all PHI bucket activity (past 72 hours minimum) to a separate S3 bucket with object lock enabled
  • Capture Auth0 logs for affected user(s) — full session and token history
  • Screenshot Datadog anomaly charts before alert state changes
  • Document: who collected each artifact, timestamp, storage location — use chain-of-custody log template (Appendix A)
  • Do not terminate EC2/ECS instances until memory dump is captured if active session is suspected

Communication protocol

  • Notify General Counsel via cell within 15 minutes of S1 confirmation
  • Notify CEO via cell within 15 minutes — IC makes this call directly
  • Do NOT post specifics about data accessed or affected clients in general Slack channels
  • Do NOT notify hospital clients until Legal has reviewed scope and messaging — premature notification can cause compliance issues
  • Internal status updates: IC posts to #inc-channel every 30 minutes during active response

Escalation path

  • If any EU hospital client data involved → engage Covington immediately for GDPR supervisory authority guidance
  • If law enforcement contact is anticipated → stop all remediation, call Covington first

Eradication steps

  1. Rotate all credentials with access to affected data stores (coordinate with Legal — do this after evidence is preserved).
  2. Patch or disable the vulnerability or misconfiguration that enabled access.
  3. Audit all IAM policies touching PHI resources for least-privilege violations.
  4. Confirm no persistence mechanisms (backdoor accounts, Lambda functions, scheduled queries) remain.

Recovery steps

  1. Re-enable affected services only after Technical Lead signs off on eradication.
  2. Enable enhanced logging (Snowflake audit trail, S3 access logging) if not already active.
  3. Monitor for 24 hours post-recovery with manual watch on anomaly dashboards.
  4. IC declares incident closed; hands off to postmortem process.

Regulatory notification requirements

FrameworkTriggerDeadlineOwner
HIPAA Breach Notification RuleUnsecured PHI accessed by unauthorized person60 days post-discovery to HHS; 60 days to affected individuals; immediate to Covered Entity clients (per BAA terms — check each BAA)General Counsel + Covington